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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTHS AND
REALITIES: WHY AN INSURANCE CRISIS IS
NOT A LAWSUIT CRISIS1
Douglas A. Kysar, *
Thomas 0. McGarity** and
Karen Sokol***
President Bush made legislative changes to the civil justice
system a priority in his second term, arguing that federal
displacement of traditional state common law will help solve the
nation's healthcare crisis and bolster the economy. 2 Proposals for
"tort reform" raise far-reaching and important issues. Certainly,
careful analysis should precede any attempt to alter by legislative fiat
several centuries of accumulated wisdom among judges, citizen-
jurors, and litigants about how best to hold defendants accountable
for wrongful conduct and to secure justice for injured victims.
Unfortunately, the current debate over the civil justice system is
characterized less by careful analysis than by unfounded claims,
shrill rhetoric, and spurious anecdote.
3
1. This Article is based in part on a white paper that the authors prepared
for the Center for Progressive Reform.
• Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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2. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint
Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
126, 127 (Feb. 2, 2005)[hereinafter Bush, State of the Union Address] ("Justice
is distorted and our economy is held back by irresponsible class actions and
frivolous asbestos claims, and I urge Congress to pass legal reforms this
year .... I ask Congress to move forward on ... medical liability reform that
will reduce health care costs and make sure patients have the doctors and care
they need."); see also Jeffrey H. Bimbaum & John F. Harris, President's
Proposed Remedy to Curb Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Stalls, WASH. POST,
Apr. 3, 2005, at A5 (describing how the President's medical malpractice bill
stalled in the Senate).
3. Marc Galanter has long provided the most skillful and engaging
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The situation is particularly acute with respect to the debate over
medical malpractice law, where a body of misinformation has proven
so durable and influential that Tom Baker has dubbed it "the medical
malpractice myth."4 As he observes in his important recent book:
[b]uilt on a foundation of urban legend mixed with the
occasional true story, supported by selective references to
academic studies, and repeated so often that even the
mythmakers forget the exaggeration, half truth, and outright
misinformation employed in the service of their greater
good, the medical malpractice myth has filled doctors,
patients, legislators, and voters with the kind of fear that
short circuits critical thinking.
5
As detailed in this Article, the United States is unquestionably
suffering from a healthcare crisis-one symptom of which is an
unnecessarily high number of injuries caused by doctors and other
healthcare providers-and also from a malpractice insurance crisis.
However, contrary to the arguments of those who support restrictions
on common law remedies, there is no medical malpractice lawsuit
crisis.
Insurance companies, managed-care organizations, doctors'
associations, and other interest groups have heavily invested in
media campaigns to convince policy-makers and the public that
recent increases in malpractice insurance premiums have been
caused by a civil justice system that too easily tolerates meritless
malpractice claims. 6  A growing number of empirical studies,however, conclude that the tort system in general-and malpractice
debunkings of popular misconceptions regarding the tort system. E.g., Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The
Fabled Menace of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIs. L. REv. 1; Marc Galanter,
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093 (1996);
Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28
GA. L. REv. 633 (1994); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Marc S.
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
4. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 (2005).
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.
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liability in particular-have been quite stable for the past two
decades.7 Furthermore, careful inquiries into insurance industry
dynamics have identified insurers' business practices, rather than
malpractice payouts, as the primary source of premium volatility.
8
Indeed, as Baker observes, medical malpractice insurers are
essentially locked in a boom-and-bust cycle that causes periodic
premium spikes irrespective of caps on medical malpractice damages
or other legislative restrictions.
9
Advocates of malpractice-liability "reforms" have attempted to
shift the blame for increased malpractice premiums onto the civil
justice system, and the blame for the alarming lack of access to
affordable, quality healthcare in the United States onto malpractice
victims and their attorneys.' 0 These advocates claim that rampant
lawsuit abuse drives physicians either to practice so-called
"defensive medicine" or to leave the medical field entirely. They
argue that these reactions increase healthcare costs and diminish
healthcare availability. 1' However, given the overwhelming
evidence of stability in the civil justice system, it would be surprising
if either the defensive-medicine claim or the physician-flight claim
fail to withstand empirical scrutiny. As it turns out, only a single
study, which two non-partisan congressional research agencies have
dismissed as unreliable, provides the primary support for the claim
that the fear of lawsuits is driving doctors to order unnecessary tests
and procedures.12 Better designed follow-up studies have found little
or no evidence that fear of liability causes unnecessary medical
7. See infra Part M.A.
8. BAKER, supra note 4, at 45.
9. Id. at 45 (2005) (observing that "the insurance industry goes through a
boom-and-bust cycle that creates medical malpractice insurance crises" and
that "[l]awyers, judges, and juries have little or nothing to do with it").
10. See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Speech at the
Gateway Center in Collinsville, Illinois (Jan. 5, 2005), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050105-4.html [hereinafter Bush, Collinsville
Speech].
11. Id.
12. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP No. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE 29-30 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf;
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 6 (2004).
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expenditures. 13 Similarly, with regard to the claim that the threat of
malpractice awards has caused physician flight, a recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the physician supply
in this country has outpaced the population growth for the past
decade. 14
In short, the "lawsuit" crisis appears to be nothing more than a
well coordinated public-relations creation aimed at imposing radical
restrictions on common law liability. The best available empirical
evidence suggests that the civil justice system is not inundated with
baseless claims, that insurance companies' losses in malpractice
lawsuits are not driving premium hikes, that doctors are not
disappearing, and that there is no surge in "defensive medicine"
contributing to increased healthcare costs. Thus, judicially or
legislatively imposed restrictions on medical malpractice liability
will serve to limit the liability of negligent healthcare providers and
their insurance companies without significantly improving the
quantity or quality of medical care. Worse still, such restrictions will
deprive innocent victims of their right to redress for wrongful injury,
and will greatly reduce the capacity of the civil justice system to hold
negligent professionals accountable for their wrongful conduct.
I. THE POLITICAL SETING FOR
THE CURRENT MALPRACTICE DEBATE.
Shortly after winning the 2004 election, President Bush
launched an aggressive campaign for a national overhaul of medical-
malpractice liability, 15 pressing Congress to enact legislationrestricting liability not only for healthcare providers, but also for
13. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice
Liability on the Delivery of Health Care 2, 18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10,709, 2004) (finding "little evidence of change
in treatment patterns in response to increases in premiums").
14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. Gao-04-124, Physician
WORKFORCE: PHYSICIAN SUPPLY INCREASED IN METROPOLITAN AND
NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS BUT GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES PERSISTED 2
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04124.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Bush Pushes Plan to Limit Medical Liability
Suits, KNIGHT RIDDER NEwSPAPERs, Jan. 5, 2005, http://www.tilrc.org/docs/
0105liability.htm; Bush, Collinsville Speech, supra note 10 (emphasizing
agenda to push medical malpractice liability limits before audience of
healthcare professionals in southern Illinois).
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manufacturers of drugs and other medical products.' 6 Several states
have adopted similar legislation,' 7 and the U.S. House of
Representatives has passed malpractice liability bills on a number of
previous occasions.' To date, however, opposition in the Senate has
prevented malpractice legislation at the federal level. 19 Nevertheless,
President Bush and the various trade associations whose members
would benefit from restrictions on medical malpractice liability
apparently believed that under this administration, Congress would
finally enact "real medical liability reform," given that candidate
Bush "often talked about malpractice litigation in [his] campaign"
and therefore "now had a mandate."
20
Although the war in Iraq and Hurricane Katrina soon moved
malpractice-liability legislation off the political center stage, it
remains a high priority for the Administration and many influential
legislators. 2 1 Bills currently in committee in both the House and the
Senate22 would limit liability for healthcare providers and
manufacturers of medical products by, inter alia, capping non-
economic compensatory damages (known as "pain and suffering"
damages) at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars,23 restricting the
16. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
(HEALTH) Act of 2005, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. § 9(7) (2005). The Senate
bill-S. 354-has the same title and language as the House bill; the bills differ
only in their section numbering. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely
Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, S. 354, 109th Cong. §3(7) (2005). The
sections referenced throughout the remainder of this Article are in those in the
House bill.
17. See J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR JUSTICE &
DEMOCRACY, PREMIUM DECEIT: THE FAILURE OF "TORT REFORM" TO CUT
INSURANCE PRICES app.A-Medical Malpractice "Tort Reforms" (2002)
(listing the types of restriction on medical malpractice liability that have been
enacted in each state).
18. See Steve Teske, Frist Willing to Discuss Insurance Reforms to Move
Malpractice Legislation This Year, 14 HEALTH L. REP. 360 (Mar. 17, 2005).
19. Id.
20. See Robert Pear, Bush Begins Drive to Limit Malpractice Suit Awards,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A18.
21. See Medical Malpractice Legislation in Limbo Until Next Year, WASH.
SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.aaem.org/
washingtonsentinel/washingtonsentinel
_oct2005.pdf.
22. See S. 354, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005).
23. H.R. 534, 109th Cong., § 4(b), § 9(15) (2005).
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availability and amount of punitive damages, 24 requiring plaintiffs to
bring claims within three years of manifestation of their injury, 25 and
restricting the amounts attorneys may collect on a contingency fee
basis. 26 Although the bills pay lip service to federalism, 27 they will,
if enacted, deeply encroach upon the longstanding ability of state
courts and legislators to craft common law rules and to regulate the
legal profession within their borders. According to President Bush,
such legislation is necessary because a proliferation of "baseless
suits" extending "all across this country" has resulted in high
insurance premiums, in the practice of "defensive medicine" by
doctors, and in a flight of doctors from the medical profession.
2 8
IX. THE REALITY OF A MALPRACTICE CRISIS.
Like any business or profession, healthcare providers make
mistakes; unlike many other businesses and professions, however,
the consequences of errors are often much higher because healthcare
providers are in the business of saving lives. According to the
National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine (IOM),
"medical errors are the leading cause of accidental death in the
United States." 29 IOM estimates that "[a]t least 44,000 people, and
perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals each year as a
result of medical errors that could have been prevented. 3°
Moreover, IOM cautions that these numbers are a "'very modest
estimate of the magnitude of the problem since hospital patients
represent only a small proportion of the total population at risk' from
medical errors."
31
24. See id. § 7.
25. Id. § 3.
26. Id. § 5(a).
27. See id. § 11 (b), (c) (discussing the effects of House Bill 534 on the
states).
28. Bush Collinsville Speech, supra note 10.
29. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil
Justice System 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,825,
2004) (citing INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM (2000)).
30. INST. OF MED., REPORT BRIEF: To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999), available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master
/4/117/0.pdf.
31. Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 835, 850 (2002) (quoting INST. OF MED., supra note 28, at 2.
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At first glance, this sobering assessment would seem to explain
the assertion-repeatedly made by proponents of increased federal
control over the state civil justice system-that malpractice lawsuits
flood state courts. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently
concluded, however, that very few medical injuries ever become the
subject of a tort claim.32 For instance, data compiled in the landmark
Harvard Medical Practice Study, 33 which remains to date the most
important attempt to document the extent of medical negligence in
the healthcare system, supports the conclusion that the tort system is
vastly underutilized.34  Using a conservative methodology for
identifying negligent medical care, 35 the Harvard researchers found
that of the 27,179 cases of medical negligence identified in New
York State hospitals in 1984, only 1.5 percent of victims filed
medical malpractice claims.36 Several more recent studies support
the conclusion that there is too little litigation brought against
negligent care providers. As Baker observes, "[d]epending on how
we count, there are between seven and twenty-five serious medical
malpractice injuries for everyone one medical malpractice lawsuit."
37
Although the evidence indicates that only a small proportion of
malpractice victims seek redress in the civil justice system, tort
liability remains a principal vehicle for holding healthcare providers
accountable for medical errors.3 8 There is no national system for
32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 7.
33. See A.R. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study III, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991).
34. See id.
35. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 29.
36. CoNG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12. Further, as CBO points out, the
27,179 total cases of negligence "included 5,396 with strong evidence that the
negligence contributed to patient disabilities of six months or more-and the
estimated 415 claims actually filed correspond to just 7.7 percent of that
smaller number of cases." Id. at 7 n.19; see also PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A
MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION,
AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 62 (1993) (suggesting that the "real tort crisis
may consist in too few claims").
37. BAKER, supra note 4, at 23. Baker supports his estimates through a
careful and comprehensive review of medical error studies, some of which
replicate the Harvard research team's methodology and validate its results, and
others of which reach the same general conclusion using different
methodologies altogether. See id. at 30-36.
38. See, e.g., id. at 108-10 (describing the reaction of the American Society
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disciplining careless medical practitioners. The limited oversight
that does occur is undertaken by state medical boards composed
primarily of physicians. The evidence suggests that these boards
have not adequately provided the discipline necessary to reduce
malpractice injuries to acceptable levels. For instance, although a
very small number of negligent doctors appears to be responsible for
most of the malpractice in this country, physicians seem reluctant
to revoke licenses or to take other disciplinary action against these
few "bad actors.' 40 According to one report, state medical boards
disciplined only 8% of the 35,000 doctors who made two or more
payments on malpractice claims from 1990 to 2002, and only 17% of
the 2,744 doctors who made five or more malpractice payments
41during that time period.
Similarly, a recent Washington Post review of state medical
board records found that "[s]cores of physicians in the [District of
Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland] and across the country have been
given repeated chances to practice, despite well-documented drug
and alcohol problems., 42 According to the Post, records show that
these doctors "have stayed in business with the permission of state
medical boards and hospitals, even when many have relapsed
multiple times and posed a danger to patients.
' ' 3
Furthermore, because of weaknesses in the national system for
reporting state disciplinary actions, even the relatively few
physicians whose licenses are revoked by medical boards are often
of Anesthesiologists to the insurance crisis of the 1980s, in which the Society
analyzed anesthesia-related medical malpractice claims and ultimately
developed new equipment and practice guidelines that substantially lowered
the rate of adverse anesthesia events and, consequently, also lowered insurance
premium prices for anesthesiologists).
39. PUB. CITIZEN, STOPPING REPEAT OFFENDERS: THE KEY TO CUT-rING
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS (2002), http://www.citizen.org/congress/
civjus/medmal/articles.cfm?ID=8308 (describing how a mere five percent of
practicing physicians accounted for over half of the medical malpractice that
occurred in the United States from 1990 to 2002).
40. See Stephanie Mencimer, Malpractice Makes Perfect: How the GOP
Milks a Phony Doctors' Insurance Crisis, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 23-
24.
41. See Sidney M. Wolfe, Bad Doctors Get a Free Ride, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2003, at A25.
42. Cheryl W. Thompson, Medical Boards Let Physicians Practice Despite
Drug Abuse, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2005, at Al.
43. Id.
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able to obtain licenses in other states and thereby have an
opportunity to commit malpractice once again. 44 To address this
problem, Congress created a national reporting system, known as the
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), "to allow licensing boards
and employers to check on doctors' records before they are hired and
to prevent problem doctors from state-hopping."45  The NPDB,
however, is incomplete because many doctors subjected to
disciplinary action are either never reported or are reported so late
that they are able to move and set up practice elsewhere before
detection.46
In short, the limited evidence available on the performance of
state medical boards is consistent with the folk wisdom that it is not
wise to trust a fox to guard the henhouse. Physicians understandably
regard the civil justice system with unease. Having devoted
themselves to a life of study and practice in service of public health,
physicians can easily be persuaded to view the civil justice system as
society's ungrateful and misinformed attempt to second-guess their
work. Yet much medical-malpractice litigation is the inevitable
result of the failure of their own professional associations to self-
regulate.47 Left to its own devices, the medical profession is not
likely to police the activities of its own members with adequate
enthusiasm, and it is not likely to levy stringent sanctions against
those who are found to have violated professional norms.48
The choice for doctors, then, is not between medical-malpractice
law and self-regulation, but between medical-malpractice law and
some more direct and intrusive form of government oversight.
Understood from that vantage point, tort law would seem to
represent an attractive vehicle for ensuring patient safety, even to
those interest groups who currently seek its "reform.,
49
44. See Cheryl W. Thompson, Poor Performance Records Are Easily
Outdistanced, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2005, at Al.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Mencimer, supra note 40.
48. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 38; Sidney M. Wolfe, Op-Ed., Bad
Doctors Get a Free Ride, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A25.
49. BAKER, supra note 4, at 114 (noting that unlike direct government
regulation, "[l]awsuits represent a free-market, bottom-up approach to safety
that fits well with our national character").
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Moreover, by joining forces with insurance companies and other
healthcare industry giants, physicians' groups overlook a very real
political opportunity to join with consumers, taxpayers, and citizens
in an effort to resist ongoing business transformations that limit
physicians' day-to-day exercise of medical discretion much more
than the remote threat of lawsuits.50 Ironically, at the same time that
insurers, managed care companies, and other institutional players
exert greater control over physicians' decisionmaking, they also
obtain greater protection from government regulation and common
law tort liability.
5 1
Unless officials at both state and federal levels adopt serious
changes in how they oversee the healthcare system-an unlikely
possibility as long as physicians' groups provide political support
and an appealing public face for the forces benefited by the status
quo-the civil justice system will remain the primary regulatory
vehicle for compensating wrongfully injured patients and deterring
future medical error.52  Thus, in large part due to the political
decisions of their own professional associations, physicians will find
themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable straitjacket, as they
remain the primary targets of the civil justice system even while their
ability to influence patient outcomes is steadily eroded by structural
changes in the management and delivery of healthcare.
III. THE REALITY OF AN INSURANCE CRISIS.
In addition to an epidemic of medical malpractice, 53 the nation
suffers from recurring episodes in which insurances companies
dramatically increase the cost of medical-malpractice insurance
50. See George Silver, Health Care: Beyond Markets, WASH. POST, Nov.
11, 2004, at A37.
51. Id. The late George Silver, an emeritus professor of public health at
Yale University School of Medicine, observed that the modem healthcare
system is dominated by "industrial giants, many of them publicly traded, [who]
have been enticed to the table by the promise of large profits and guarantees of
total federal immunity from efforts to regulate their practices and businesses."
Id.; see also infra note 59 (describing the preemptive effects of ERISA as
applied to managed care providers).
52. See Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the
Insurance Industry and the GOP Promote the Myth of America's "Lawsuit
Crisis," WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2004, at 18, 19-20; Silver, supra note 50.
53. BAKER, supra note 4, at 19.
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coverage. 54 One such increase occurred from the late 1990s until
around 2002, when insurance companies demanded escalating
premiums for many of their policyholders seeking coverage for
medical-malpractice liability.55 For example, in Texas, one of the
states that the American Medical Association (AMA) recently
declared to be experiencing a "medical liability crisis," malpractice
56premiums rose 135% from 1999 to 2002. Such dramatic spikes
create enormous financial hardship for physicians, who typically
must obtain their own malpractice insurance, even when they
practice within a hospital or managed care organization setting and
tend to capture onl7y a small portion of the revenues generated by the
healthcare system.
Advocates of restricting access to civil justice for victims of
medical injury point to these episodes of malpractice insurance
volatility as evidence that their policy proposals are needed.58 These
advocates are inclined, however, to ignore some inconvenient
realities. For instance, after the Texas legislature (at the urging of
then-Governor George W. Bush) passed a law in 1995 limiting the
amount of punitive damages that juries could assess for particularly
egregious defendant behavior, insurance premiums continued to
rise 5  despite the legislative changes. Rather than admit the
54. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO
INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 3 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf.
55. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12 at 1;U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 3.
56. Ceci Connolly, Malpractice Situation Not Dire, Study Finds, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A8.
57. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 64-65, 174-78 (arguing that healthcare
institutions, such as hospitals and managed care organizations, are better
positioned to grapple with the year-to-year variance of liability insurance
premiums and, more importantly, to negotiate with insurers for less volatile
premium-setting practices).
58. MIMI MARCHEV, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: OPPORTUNITY FOR STATE
ACTION 1 (2002), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/gnl48-medical-
malpractice.PDF.
59. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
In contrast to the 1995 legislation restricting a Texas citizen's right to seek
judicial redress for wrongful injuries, the Texas legislature passed a law two
years later that created a statutory cause of action for injuries caused by
negligent healthcare treatment decisions against health insurance carriers,
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possibility that the civil justice system was not responsible for the
rising malpractice insurance rates, lobbyists for insurance companies
and healthcare providers demanded even further cutbacks on the
amount that malpractice victims could recover for non-economic
compensatory damages.
60
The recent malpractice insurance crisis is not the first one that
this country has experienced: Similar crises erupted in the mid-1970s
and again in the mid-1980s.6 1 Like the current crisis, both of these
previous episodes occurred during a time of relative stability in
medical malpractice litigation and claim payments. They were
seized upon by the insurance industry, the medical establishment,
and various "think tanks" in an urgent call for limiting victims' rights
within the civil justice system.
In an attempt to address the first medical insurance crisis,
California in 1975 passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA), which provides the model for federal legislation that
President Bush is currently urging Congress to pass.62 In a major
speech in which he advocated a two hundred and fifty thousand
dollar federal cap on non-economic damages,63 President Bush
health maintenance organizations, and other companies that manage healthcare
plans. Id. § 88.002(a). However, the Supreme Court recently held that this
Texas law was preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). AETNA Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221
(2004). As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her concurring opinion, the Court's
expansive interpretation of the preemptive effect of ERISA in cases preceding
Davila has resulted in a "regulatory vacuum," given that adequate alternative
rules or remedies are not provided by ERISA as interpreted by the Court. Id. at
222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The expansive preemptive effect of ERISA
with respect to managed care companies underscores the necessity of
considering the proposed federal medical malpractice liability restrictions in
light of the lack of effective alternative means of protecting malpractice
victims, as discussed supra Part II and infra Part V. See also Black et al.,
Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1998-
2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005); Connolly, supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Bruce L. Ehni, Op-Ed, Prescription: Lower Legal Awards,
CmzENs AGAINST LAwSUIT ABUSE, Apr. 13, 2003, http://www.tala.com/CIN/
FWST4-13-03.htm.
61. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting
Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (2005).
62. See Bush Collinsville Speech, supra note 10.
63. Even the reasoning behind the $250,000 amount for the non-economic
damages cap in current proposed legislation is woefully inadequate. As
[Vol. 39:2
MYTHS AND REALITIES
pointed to a similar cap in MICRA and noted that "since 1975,
insurance premiums for California doctors have become much more
affordable than anywhere else in the country-than in most states."
64
The President did not mention that premiums in California continued
to increase long after MICRA was enacted.65 In fact, premium prices
did not stabilize until 1988, after Californians voted in favor of "the
nation's most stringent reform of the insurance industry's rates and
practices. ' 66 Now, unlike state insurance regulators who traditionally
have lacked the power or the resources necessary to effectively
oversee the business practices of liability insurers, California
regulators benefit from reforms that have empowered them to bring
much-needed stability to premium rate-setting practices.
67
Amanda Edwards has determined, the author of the original MICRA
legislation in California settled on the $250,000 amount out of a belief that it
would provide a certain level of financial stability to seriously injured victims
of medical negligence:
The theory was that you could never really and adequately compensate
for pain and suffering, no matter how much money you provided.
Money just doesn't do it. But $250,000 (in addition to meeting the
medical and other needs of the patient), properly invested to the extent
that it elevated the quality of life over and above the post-injury status,
was thought to be enough to do that job.
Amanda K. Edwards, Note, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages
Caps, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 213, 226 (2006) (quoting former Assemblyman
Barry Keene). The fact that proponents of medical malpractice law restrictions
have failed to update this $250,000 amount despite the erosive impact of
inflation over the past three decades suggests just how far the medical
malpractice debate has lost sight of the purposes and practices of tort law.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Harvey Rosenfield, President, Foundation
for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights), available at http://energycommerce.house
.gov/108/hearings/02272003Hearing796/rosenfield.pdf [hereinafter Rosenfield
Testimony on Medical Liability Reform].
66. Id.; see also Edwards, supra note 63, at 216-219. Like California's
MICRA statute, other states' tort "reform" measures do not appear to have
affected premium rates, as confirmed by a recent study of insurance rate
activity in every state from 1985 to 1998. See J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE
DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, PREMIUM DECEIT: THE
FAILURE OF "TORT REFORM" TO CUT INSURANCE PRICES 2 (2002).
67. See Rosenfield Testimony on Medical Liability Reform, supra note 65,
at 9. Importantly, California's insurance reform measure, Proposition 103,
requires insurance companies to obtain the state insurance department's
approval before increasing or decreasing premium rates, a mechanism that
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The failure of tort restrictions to stop the rise in premium rates is
unsurprising. Insurance companies do not base premium rates
solely--or even primarily--on claim payouts.68  Because of the
inevitable lag time between insurance companies' receipt of
premiums and their obligation to pay claims,6 companies invest
paid-in premiums in bonds and other financial instruments.
70
Contrary to popular perceptions, it is the return from these
investments, rather than present or past premium receipts that
generates the bulk of insurance-company profits.71
Consequently, even when malpractice claim payouts remain
stable, companies can incur significant losses if their earlier premium
pricing practices were premised on unduly optimistic projections of
either future investment returns or future payment obligations.
7 2
Losses can be especially severe if, during these times of excess
optimism, a company offers artificially low premium rates in an
attempt to gain a larger market share.73 And, of course, the presence
of market competitors that are subject to these same financial and
behavioral incentives can significantly amplify the pressure to
engage in short-sighted pricing practices.74 Ultimately, this industry
behavior creates a boom-and-bust pattern-known as the
"underwriting cycle"--that companies are largely powerless to
escape.75
This pattern occurred prior to each insurance premium "crisis"
76experienced in this country over the last two decades. Thus,
enables state regulators to prevent companies from placing themselves (and
their policyholders) in a precarious financial position by unduly lowering rates
to increase market share. Id. at 8.
68. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 7, 15-17.
69. Baker, supra note 61, at 398; Baicker & Chandra, supra note 13, at 5.
70. Baker, supra note 61, at 406-08.
71. See AMs. FOR INS. REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 2004, at 3 (2004), http://www.insurance_
reform.org/StableLossesO4.pdf.
72. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 35.
73. See Baker, supra note 61, at 400 (explaining the effect of relying on
wrongly assumed rates at the start of a hard market).
74. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 7.
75. See Baker, supra note 61, at 396; BAKER, supra note 4, at 51.
76. Baker, supra note 61, at 394. Moreover, there is some reason to believe
that the traditional causes of the underwriting cycle have been joined by an
increasing willingness of at least some liability insurers to adopt more
aggressive investing and accounting practices than they have in the past. See
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although legislation severely limiting the amounts that victims of
medical malpractice can recover from negligent healthcare providers
may indeed decrease insurance companies' payouts, they will be the
very sort of payouts that insurance companies are supposed to be in
the business of insuring. Moreover, such legislation will fail to
address the underlying business dynamics that lead to the
problematic underwriting cycle.
To be sure, a successfully functioning healthcare industry
requires a healthy medical insurance industry. But the rights and
responsibilities created by the civil justice system respond to much
more than simply a social desire for insurance companies to remain
in the black. The primary goals of the civil justice system are to
provide victims with compensation, to provide an incentive to
healthcare professionals to adhere to minimum standards of care, and
to provide society with a vehicle for condemning egregious
misconduct. 7 7  Rather than treat the symptoms of an insurance
market disease with another round of excisions and amputations of
the civil justice system-this time through a gross intrusion of the
federal government into areas of traditional state authority-
Congress should stay its hand and allow the states to consider
reforms similar to the successful California insurance market
regulations.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 35. Although the extent of
such practices across the industry is unknown, anecdotal reports suggest that at
least some insurers during the bull market of the 1990s began investing in
growth companies such as Enron and WorldCom, as opposed the more
conservative bond market investments that conventionally characterize
insurance industry investment practices. Id.; see, e.g., Press Release, Office of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Statement in Opposition to the Medical
Malpractice Amendment (July 26, 2002), http://www.senate.gov/-kennedy/
statements/02/07/2002730306.html (describing how St. Paul, one of the largest
of the financially-troubled medical malpractice insurers, sustained a $108
million loss as a result of Enron's demise). The competitive drive to attract
greater market share and inflows of capital also seems to have encouraged at
least one prominent insurer to adopt misleading accounting practices. See
Jenny Anderson, Insurance Giant Calls Its Accounting Improper, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2005, at Al (reporting that American International Group, one of the
world's largest insurance companies and a leading malpractice insurer,
admitted "that its accounting for a number of transactions.., was improper").
77. See, e.g., Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Is the
"Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1121, 1123 (2005).
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III. THE MYTH OF A LAWsUrr CRIsIs.
A broad assortment of politicians, healthcare providers,
professional organizations, conservative think-tanks, and industry-
funded "astroturf' 78 organizations have gone to great lengths to
convince the public that meritless tort claims have loaded the civil
justice system to the breaking point.79 These groups support their
case against supposed rampant "lawsuit abuse," not by citing
rigorous empirical studies, but by dint of constant repetition of
isolated anecdotes 80 and by skillfully framing the debate with vague,
but evocative terms like "flood," "proliferation," and "explosion."
81
These groups do not engage in careful empirical analysis of existing
data on how litigants in fact use the civil justice system. 82 Despite
their crudeness, these perceptual machinations have been successful,
even among sophisticated and engaged audiences: "When asked to
list the two most important problems with healthcare and medicine
today, nearly one-third of U.S. doctors listed medical malpractice
lawsuits and insurance, while only 5 percent listed medical mistakes,
injuries, or related topics.'
83
A. The Alleged "Lawsuit Crisis."
The existing empirical data on how the civil justice system
78. An Astroturf organization is a corporate--or interest group-funded
association that purports to represent a "grass roots" citizens movement. See
Sharon Beder, Public Relations' Role in Manufacturing Artificial Grass Roots
Coalitions, 43 PUB. REL. Q. 21 (1998).
79. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL McCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 44 (2004).
80. E.g., id. at 52 (noting that the tort-"reform" campaign has "shaped
common sense less by rigorous arguments and systematic measurements than
by skillful rhetoric, alluring narratives, and consistent convictions," and that
"remarkable encapsulizations of ideological and moral critiques of the modem
tort regime persist in 'tort tales,' anecdotes and horror stories about civil
litigation in the United States").
81. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr (1991); David E.
Bernstein, Procedural Tort Reform: Lessons from Other Nations, REG.: CATO
REv. OF Bus. & GOv'T, Winter 1996, at 71, available at http://www.
cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl9nle.html; Joseph Perkins, We All Pay When
Others File Frivolous Lawsuits, CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE,
http://www.calahouston.org/perkins.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
82. See Mencimer, supra note 52, at 18, 19-20.
83. BAKER, supra note 4, at 95.
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functions does not support the claim that the United States is
experiencing a "lawsuit crisis." 84 First, the vast majority of civil
claims are not tort claims.85 According to the most recent analysis
by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Statistics, tort claims
accounted for only 10% of civil filings in state courts in 1993 and
86have remained stable since 1986. Second, the kinds of tort claims
that are targeted by those advocating restriction of the civil justice
system (that is, medical malpractice and products liability claims)
represent only a very small portion of the nation's total tort filings.
8 7
The overwhelming majority of tort cases instead involve automobile
accidents (60.1%), while the second largest category of tort filings
concerns premises liability (17.3%). 88  Only 4.9% of the filings
allege medical malpractice.
89
Third, if there is an "explosion" in civil litigation, it is not in
malpractice lawsuits, but in claims for trademark infringement,
breach of contract, and commercial torts.90 The National Center for
State Courts found that from 1998 to 2002, the number of tort cases
has been "overtaken" by the "steadily" rising number of contract
cases,9 1 which are more likely to involve businesses suing other
businesses and which, unsurprisingly, are generally not a part of the
civil justice system targeted for "reform. 92 Finally, the empirical
evidence suggests that the number of tort filings has in fact been
declining since the beginning of the 1990s.93 The National Center
for State Courts found that the number of tort claims filed in thirty-
five states accounting for 77% of the United States population
84. Mencimer, supra note 52, at 18.
85. STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TORT CASES IN
LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsl
pub/pdf/tcilc.pdf.
86. Id. (indicating that most civil filings in 1993-41%--were for cases
involving domestic relations, such as divorce and child custody).
87. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See PUB. CITIZEN, FREQUENT FILERS: CORPORATE HYPOCRISY IN
ACCESSING THE COURTS 6-7 (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/Frequent FilersFINAL.pdf.
91. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2003, at 23 (2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_Research/csp/2003_Files/2003_SubCivil-TORTCON.pdf.
92. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 89, at 3.
93. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 90, at 23.
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dropped by four percent during the period from 1993 to 2002.94
When adjusted for population, the decline in tort filings over the
same time period is even steeper: For the 31 states reporting adjusted
data to the Center, the average change in the rate of tort filings per
100,000 people decreased by approximately 13.6%. 95
When the focus is narrowed to malpractice litigation, the
empirical basis for claims of a "lawsuit crisis" still appears weak.
Nationally, the population-adjusted number of medical malpractice
claims filed in states reporting to the National Center for State Courts
actually dropped by 1 percent from 1992 to 2001.96 A more detailed
study of Texas medical malpractice claims, undertaken by Professors
Black, Silver, Hyman and Sage, severely undermines the claim that
the recent medical malpractice insurance crisis originated in the civil
justice system.97 The study examined a database of all closed claims
maintained by the Texas Department of Insurance between 1988 and
982002. When adjusted for population, the number of paid claims of
more than $25,000 remained roughly constant, and the number of
smaller claims actually declined. 99 Moreover, the amount paid out
per large claim increased only 0.1% to 0.5% per year when
controlled for inflation. 1°° Having found no "evidence in claim
outcomes of the medical malpractice insurance crisis that produced
headlines over the last several years and led to legal reform in Texas
and other states,"'' 01 the authors instead concluded that "much of the
rise in premiums reflects insurance market dynamics, not litigation
dynamics."'
102
This story is not unique to Texas. Florida's legislature severely
curtailed malpractice victims' rights to recovery in 1986 to combat
an alleged insurance crisis brought on by the tort system.'03 Despite
94. Id.
95. See id. at 24 (discussing growth rates of tort filings in unified and
general jurisdiction trial courts in thirty-one states between 1993 and 2002).
96. See id. at 28.
97. See Black et al., supra note 59 at 252; see also Bernard Black et al.,
False Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 2005, at A27.
98. Black, et al., supra note 58, at 207.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 210.
103. See Rosenfield Testimony on Medical Liability Reform, supra note 66,
at 14.
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this legislation, insurance companies have increased medical
malpractice premiums in the state by "an average of 30 percent to 50
percent since 2000."'' °4 Indeed, even after convincing Florida
lawmakers to further limit medical malpractice victims' rights in
2003, insurance companies successfully sought permission from the
state insurance agency to increase rates by as much as forty-five
percent. 10 5  The explanation for these developments is not to be
found in some explosion of medical malpractice suits: A study of
Florida claims similar to the Texas study found that the medical
malpractice liability system in Florida remained essentially stable
during the fourteen-year period from 1990 to 2003.106
In particular, the Florida researchers found that insurance
companies in the state paid approximately the same average number
of malpractice claims per capita from 1999 to 2003 as they did from
1990 to 1994.107 Although the number of claims over the time
period was quite stable, the researchers did observe an upward trend
in mean and median recovery. 10 8 The researchers attributed this
trend in large part to a change in the mix of cases reported toward
more severe injuries and death, as well as possibly to increases in
medical care costs that have outpaced inflation.10
A particularly revealing finding was that almost ninety-three
percent of awards for one million dollars or more came from private
104. Stephanie Horvath, Study Finds Tort Reform Not the Answer for
Medical Malpractice Crisis, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at ID.
105. See Chris Grier, Despite Malpractice Reforms, Florida Clears Hue
Rate Hike, BestWire Serv., (Jan. 5, 2004), available at http://www
.williamgammon.con/Personal-lnjury_Law.html; Chris Grier, Florida Weighs
Giving Consumer Agency Oversight of Medical Malpractice Rates, BestWire
Serv., (Feb. 9, 2004).
106. See Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 353
(2005); cf M. Alexander Otto, Numbers Deny Malpractice Crisis, NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/
local/story/5230867p-4751465c.html (announcing the release of a report by the
Washington insurance commissioner's office that "Washington state hasn't
seen a sudden spike in closed malpractice cases in the last 10 years").
107. See Vidmar et al., supra note 105, at 334 n.103. There was a small
increase in the average number of paid claims per capita from 1995 to 1998
(specifically, about two more claims per 100,000 persons). See id. at 334 tbl.4.
108. Id. at 337.
109. See id. at 343 fig.3, 344 & n.121.
August 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
settlements rather than from jury verdicts.' 10 In some respects, this
percentage is not surprising, given that the overwhelming share of
civil claims more generally are settled rather than tried."' On the
other hand, the underlying picture of coherence and predictability of
jury practices that are implied by the finding is starkly out of line
with the depiction of "runaway juries" 1 12 that fuels much of the
medical malpractice and tort law "reform" movement.1 13 Contrary to
the "tort lottery" conception of chaos and extremism in jury decision-
making, 1 4 these settlement practices instead suggest that defense
attorneys and other sophisticated players are quite capable of
estimating trial outcomes.11 5 Hence, the Florida researchers stated
that, at a minimum, their findings suggest that "debate about the role
of juries in so-called 'mega awards' is misplaced insofar as Florida is
concerned." 1
6
A recent study of medical-malpractice litigation in Illinois"
17
further undermines the assertion that the civil justice system has been
spawning "out-of-control" jury verdicts." 8 The study's findings are
especially revealing because two of the Illinois counties analyzed-
Madison and St. Clair Counties-were dramatically designated as
the country's number-one and number-two "judicial hellholes" in
2004 by the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), 119 an
110. See id. at 349-50. The researchers also reported that,
[o]ver the fourteen years examined in... [the article], thirty-four of
the 801 million-dollar cases resulted in payments over five million
dollars. Only two were settled following a jury trial. Five of the 801
cases exceeded ten million dollars but only one was the result of a jury
trial. Of the remaining four cases over ten million dollars, one was
settled in prelitigation negotiations, and three settled before a trial had
commenced.
Id. at 349.
111. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459, 514-15 (2004).
112. See Vidmar et al., supra note 105, at 349-50.
113. See id. at355.
114. Id. at316.
115. See id. at 355.
116. Id.
117. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE TORT SYSTEM IN
ILLINOIS: A REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (2005),
available at http://www.isba.org/downloadnow/medicalmalpracticestudy.pdf.
118. Id. at83.
119. See AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005 at 4, 20-28
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industry organization specifically created to advocate legislative
restrictions on the tort system.' 20 ATRA coined the term "judicial
hellholes" to refer to areas in the country where alleged bias on the
part of judges and juries in favor of tort plaintiffs result in
unjustifiable verdicts and exorbitant damage awards. 121 However,
the Illinois study shows that plaintiffs prevailed in only eleven of the
forty trials involving medical malpractice claims in Madison and St.
Clair Counties over the fourteen-year period from 1992 to 2005.122
Of these cases, only two awards exceeded one million dollars. 12 3 As
the study's author, Duke University Law School Professor Neil
Vidmar, concluded, "[lthere is no evidence to support the perception
that medical malpractice jury trials in these counties are frequent or
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs are outrageous." He further noted
that, "[i]nsofar as medical malpractice litigation is concerned, the
reputation of Madison and St. Clair counties as 'judicial hellholes' is
not justified."'124
Finally, Baker's recent nationwide study of the amounts that
insurance companies pay for malpractice claims casts even further
doubt on the assertion that an "out of control" malpractice liability
system necessitates premium hikes. 125  In fact, according to data
from the Department of Health and Human Services, payments for
medical malpractice claims actually decreased by 8.9% last year. 26
Alluding to the confluence of his findings with those of the Texas
and Florida studies, Baker observed that "[w]hen we're getting the
same answer using completely different research methods, you can
(2005), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
120. See Carl Deal & Joanne Doroshow, Corporate Astroturf and Civil
Justice: The Corporations Behind "Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse,"
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 2003, at 21.
121. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 118, at 6, 8.
122. See VIDMAR, supra note 116, at 52 tbl.4.1, 58 tbl.4.2, 64.
123. Id. at 64.
124. Id. at ii.
125. Baker, supra note 61, at 394, 402-07; see also THOMAS H. COHEN,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIAL AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES, 2001 at 2 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/mmtvlcOl.pdf (reporting that, in the seventy-five most populous counties
in the United States, "[t]he number of medical malpractice jury trials since
1992 has remained stable").
126. Joseph B. Treaster & Joel Brinkley, Behind Those Medical Malpractice
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at Cl.
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be pretty sure we're right."'' 27 Consequently, he noted that "[i]f what
you want to do is protect doctors from the next malpractice insurance
crisis, tort reform is not going to do it."
1 28
B. Existing Constraints on Lawsuit Abuse.
Proponents of additional restrictions on the rights of malpractice
victims argue that greedy trial lawyers bring too many "frivolous"
lawsuits against innocent healthcare providers. 129 Although isolated
horror stories undoubtedly exist, the more general claim has little
empirical support. A survey of one hundred cases in which federal
judges throughout the country imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure revealed that businesses were
69% more likely than individual tort plaintiffs and their attorneys to
be sanctioned for engaging in frivolous litigation. 130 This result is
not surprising given that the contingency fee system provides an
implicit check on frivolous litigation by trial attorneys representing
individual plaintiffs. 13  While corporate attorneys are typically paid
by the hour regardless of outcome, trial attorneys working on a
contingency-fee basis are paid for their work only if their clients
prevail. Furthermore, unlike corporate attorneys, trial attorneys must
pay the costs of preparing and trying cases--often hundreds of
thousands of dollars for medical malpractice cases-and are not
reimbursed unless the case succeeds. 132  As one trial attorney
specializing in medical malpractice succinctly observed, "We do
everything we can to weed out cases that are without merit. We have
127. Horvath, supra note 103.
128. Id. An analysis of data from the National Practitioner Data Bank and
the Medical Liability Monitor conducted by the public interest group Public
Citizen found that the median payout and total amount of damages paid by
obstetricians/gynecologists have either declined or risen only at the same rate
as the cost of medical care services since 1991. PUB. CITIZEN, DATA SHOWS
RISING OB/GYN LIABILITY PREMIUMS NOT CAUSED BY MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS 2 (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACF42D4.pdf.
129. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Not so Frivolous, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at
A31.
130. PUB. CrrIzEN, supra note 89, at 11.
131. See id.
132. See id. (observing that medical malpractice trial attorneys take all of the
risk and only recover the occasional substantial claim).
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to. Our own money is at risk."'
133
While there is currently little empirical evidence that overly
aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys are bringing "frivolous" lawsuits,'
34
courts are well-equipped to discourage and punish such abuse if it
should become a significant problem in the future. Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state analogues give judges
discretion to impose a variety of sanctions-including reprimands,
fines, dismissals of claims, and injunctions-to punish litigation
abuse, deter future misconduct, and compensate parties that incur
unnecessary expenses. 135 Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized, courts may employ various sanctions to address "a
full range of litigation abuses" pursuant to their inherent judicial
power, which predates and continues to co-exist with Rule 11.136
Thus, "if in the informed discretion of the court," existing rules "are
[not] up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power"
to impose sanctions for bad-faith conduct in litigation.
1 3 7
Importantly, unlike remote federal legislators yielding blunt
instruments such as caps on contingency fees, judges can ensure that
they use these case-by-case devices only when necessary and only in
a specifically tailored fashion.
C. "Defensive Medicine" and "Doctor Flight."
The absence of an empirical basis for a lawsuit crisis casts
serious doubt on claims that doctors are practicing defensive
medicine or are leaving the medical profession out of fear of being
sued. These two impressions underlie the broader argument that the
civil justice system makes healthcare more expensive and less
accessible to ordinary citizens, because malpractice insurance
premiums alone have only a nominal effect on overall healthcare
spending. 138 As the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted in arecent report analyzing proposed federal medical malpractice
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 83-87.
135. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1336.3 (3d ed. 2004).
136. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
137. Id. at 50.
138. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 1.
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legislation, "even large savings in premiums can have only a small
direct impact on health care spending-private or governmental-
because malpractice costs account for less than 2 percent of that
spending."' 139  Thus, unless tort-change proponents have strong
evidence to support the conclusions that the threat of malpractice
liability causes doctors to employ unnecessary medical procedures or
to leave the practice of medicine altogether, the effort to link the
healthcare crisis to an alleged "lawsuit crisis" is highly implausible.
Those who claim that defensive medicine is driving up
healthcare costs frequently rely on a 1996 study published in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics in which two economists compared
the costs of care for elderly Medicare patients hospitalized for two
types of heart disease in states with and without certain legislatively-
imposed tort restrictions.140 The researchers concluded that the tort
restrictions yielded a hospital costs savings of 5 to 9 percent, a figure
that they then speculated "could lead to expenditure reductions of
over $50 billion per year without serious adverse consequences for
health outcomes" if the results "are generalizable to medical
expenditures outside the hospital, to other illnesses, and to younger
patients.' 14' The Bush administration appeared to rely solely on this
1996 study and its highly speculative extrapolation in order to
estimate the total national costs of "defensive medicine."'
' 42
However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
pointed out in a 2003 report that there is little empirical or analytical
basis for generalizing the study's limited findings to all patients
throughout the entire nation in the manner that the researchers and
139. Id.
140. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive
Medicine?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 353, 372-78 (1996).
141. Id. at 387-88.
142. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW
HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING
COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABiLiTY SYSTEM (2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf. The Bush administration laid
out the basis for its claim that the medical liability system is the primary cause
of rising healthcare costs in this 2002 Department of Health and Human
Services report. Id. at 7 & n.28. The report calls Kessler and McClellan's
1996 piece "[t]he leading study" on the costs of defensive medicine and uses
their estimate of the costs of defensive medicine as support for medical
liability restrictions. Id.
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the Bush administration did.143
Subsequent studies with a broader scope refute the proposition
that fear of liability results in unnecessary medical expenditures.'
44
When CBO applied the same methods that the 1996 study developed
to "a broader set of ailments," the agency found "no evidence that
restrictions on tort liability reduce medical spending."'145  CBO
confirmed this result in another analysis that used "a different set of
data," finding "no statistically significant difference in per capita
health care spending between states with and without limits on
malpractice torts." 14  Observing that the 1.996 study relied "on
indirect evidence from tort reform, rather than direct evidence on
malpractice costs themselves," two scholars from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) examined the defensive-
medicine claim with more empirical precision by comparing
physicians' treatment patterns in light of states' actual malpractice
premium rates rather than states' tort restrictions. 147 Using this
improved methodology and a wider array of information than used in
the 1996 study, the NBER scholars found "little evidence of change
in treatment patterns in response to increases in premiums."
' 148
In the rhetoric of proponents of malpractice liability cutbacks,
the term "defensive medicine" signifies treatments that do not
improve the quality of healthcare. 149 When evaluating these studies,
however, it is important to bear in mind that, even if a change in
physician use of a medical procedure was observed in response to
changes in the threat of malpractice, it would still be extremely
difficult to determine whether the change constituted "defensive
medicine" thus defined.1 50  After all, the social desirability of
143. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12, at 29-30.
144. See infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
145. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 6.
146. Id. at 6-7. It is also not feasible to design a study examining rates of
procedure usage that controls for motivating factors other than fear of liability.
As CBO pointed out, "some so-called defensive-medicine may be motivated
less by liability concerns than by the income it generates for physicians or by
the positive (albeit small) benefits to patients." Id. at 6.
147. See Baicker & Chandra, supra note 13, at 8-9.
148. Id. at 18.
149. See, e.g., Bush Collinsville Speech, supra note 10 (alleging that doctors
are "writing prescriptions or ordering tests that really aren't necessary, just to
reduce the potential of a future lawsuit").
150. The authors of the 1996 study attempted to make this assessment by
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treatment changes in response to malpractice costs depends on
whether the status quo practices sufficiently protected patient welfare
before the influence of tort incentives. Thus, the fact that the NBER
scholars found a correlation between increases in malpractice costs
and increased use of mammography in Medicare patients15 1 does not
by itself suggest that the treatment was unjustified. Instead, it could
represent precisely the kind of effort to improve care and lower
overall accident costs that tort law should encourage. 1
52
Legitimate concerns do exist, of course, about the accumulated
costs of countless screening tests, each of which individually may
appear desirable and necessary from the perspective of malpractice
law. But such concerns are best addressed as part of a broader policy
debate over how to design an equitable and sustainable healthcare
system that serves the needs of all Americans, wealthy or poor,
young or old, healthy or ill. Such a broader debate would begin, not
by fixating on a malpractice liability issue that represents at most 2%
of the country's annual healthcare expenditures, but by acknowledg-
ing the gross disparities in insurance coverage, treatment options,
and quality of care that characterize the American healthcare system.
Most notably, approximately one in six Americans, including 11.4%
of American children, currently lacks any form of healthcare
insurance. 153
As with the "defensive medicine" claim, the "doctor flight"
assertion has more basis in rhetoric than reality. As an empirical
matter, there simply has not been a mass exodus of doctors from the
medical profession. 154 In fact, as GAO recently reported, not only
has the number of physicians in this country been increasing for the
comparing overall longevity rates between states with and without tort
restrictions. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 139 at 361-62. Finding no
significant difference between the two categories of states, the researchers
concluded that the higher level of Medicare expenditures in non-restricted
states was not improving patient welfare. See id. at 388.
151. Baicker & Chandra, supra note 13, at 19.
152. See generally GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACcIDENTs: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYsIs (1970) (offering a pioneering vision of tort law
from this instrumentalist perspective).
153. See Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Census Data
Show Poverty Increased, Income Stagnated, and the Number of Uninsured
Rose to a Record Level in 2003 (Aug. 27, 2004), http://www.cbpp.org/8-26-
04pov.htm.
154. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14.
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past decade, but the physician increase has outpaced the U.S.
population increase. 155  According to GAO, "[t]he number of
physicians in the United States increased about 26% from 1991 to
2001, [approximately] twice as much as the nation's population."'
156
Consequently, the number of physicians adjusted for population (per
100,000 people) rose 12% from 1991 to 2001.157 Furthermore, from
1996 to 2001, the period in which the most recent malpractice
premium spike occurred-the population-adjusted increase in the
number of physicians was 2% higher than the population-adjusted
physician increase from 1991 to 1996-the period during which
insurance companies offered exceedingly low premiums as they vied
for larger market shares. 1
58
It is difficult to reconcile the fact that the physician population is
growing faster than the total U.S. population with claims of doctor
flight and resulting medical access problems. 159  When GAO
attempted to confirm such claims by conducting investigations in
five states that the AMA had deemed "crisis" states, the agency
found that "many of the reported provider actions taken in response
to malpractice pressures [could] not [be] substantiated or did not
widely affect access to health care." 160 In particular, GAO noted
that, although there was "extensive media coverage" of reports by
provider organizations that "some physicians in each of the five
states are moving, retiring, or closing practices in response to
malpractice pressures," those reports were either "inaccurate or
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 7. GAO also found that, even though the physician supply has
significantly increased over the past decade in both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas, "[t]he disparity in the supply of physicians per 100,000
people between [the two] areas persisted because physicians continued to
disproportionately locate in metropolitan areas." Id. at 12-13. As GAO
pointed out, however, the geographic disparity in physician supply is a long-
standing problem that the U.S. government has been trying to address through
various programs for decades. See id. at 5-6; see also Geoff Boehm,
Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises
Behind "Tort Reform," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 357, 361 (2005).
158. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 7 n.15.
159. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS MAP (2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/1 1871 .html.
160. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12, at 5. More specifically,
"[t]he five states with reported problems are Florida, Mississippi, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.... ." Id. at 3 n.3.
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involved relatively few physicians" and thus "did not widely affect
access to health care." 161 In fact, the only access problems that GAO
could "confirm[] were limited to scattered, often rural, locations and
in most cases providers identified long-standing factors in addition to
malpractice pressures that affected the availability of services."
' 162
Among the "doctor flight" anecdotes that GAO found to be
untrue were some involving obstetricians. Advocates of reduced
access to the civil justice system frequently recite such anecdotes,
undoubtedly because the anecdotes strongly appeal to the public's
understandable concern about the availability of high quality
healthcare to pregnant women.163 Despite the fact that obstetrics-
gynecology practitioners have often faced particularly high premium
spikes,1M there remains no convincing evidence that the spikes have
resulted in widespread access problems due to provider flight.165
161. Id. at 16-17.
162. Id. at 13. Before issuing its report finding the medical establishment's
claims of "crisis" states to be unfounded, GAO solicited comments "from three
independent health policy researchers and from AMA." Id. at 38. Although
all three independent experts "generally concurred with [GAO's] findings," the
"AMA questioned [the] finding that rising malpractice premiums have not
contributed to widespread health care access problems, expressing concern that
the scope of [GAO's] work limited [its] ability to fully identify the extent to
which malpractice-related pressures are affecting consumers' access to health
care." Id. The AMA's complaints included that "the small number of states
studied [by GAO] doesn't give an adequate picture of overall trends." Tanya
Albert, GAO Report Calls Liability Crisis Localized, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept.
22-29, 2003, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/09/22/gvsbO922.htm;
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12, at 38. However, as
GAO pointed out in response to the AMA's complaint, "because they are
among the most visible and often-cited examples of 'crisis' states.., the
experiences of these five states provide important insight into the overall
problem." Id. at 7. The AMA also questioned other aspects of GAO's
methodology and the reliability of the data underlying the agency's findings,
but GAO disagreed with these criticisms as well. See id. at 38.
163. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12, at 18.
164. See Rita Rubin, Fed-up Obstetricians Look for a Way Out, USA
TODAY, July 1, 2002, at ID.
165. It bears emphasizing again that healthcare is improved when actual
malpractice suits-rather than premium increases-lead a physician who has
repeatedly committed malpractice to leave the practice of medicine. For
example, Compton Girdharry, an obstetrician-gynecologist from Ohio whom
Bush invited to share the stage with him at an anti-lawsuit speech, told the
crowd that he quit medicine because of high malpractice premiums. See Bob
Herbert, Op-Ed., Not So Frivolous, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A31. It
appears, however, that "[s]ince the early 1990s, [Girdharry] has settled
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One recent study, for instance, found no empirical support for claims
of an exodus of obstetrician-gynecologists and other physicians from
Illinois in general or from the state's two ATRA-designated "judicial
hellhole" counties of Madison and St. Clair.' 66 Rather, based on the
AMA's own statistics, the study found that the number of
obstetrician-gynecologists, neurological surgeons, and other
physicians in Illinois had "increased steadily" in both absolute and
population-adjusted terms from 1993 to 2003.167
The NBER scholars also addressed the claim that the medical
liability system has led to a decrease in the physician supply. Their
conclusion that "[o]n average, the size of the physician workforce in
each state does not seem to respond to increases in premiums"'
168
reinforces the findings of GAO and other researchers. The NBER
study did find "weak evidence that some physicians on the margins
of their careers make entry and exit decisions in part based on the
size and number of malpractice payments" and that malpractice costs
increases "may [decrease] the size of the rural physician
workforce."' 169 Nevertheless, even if some rural physicians quit or
relocate because of malpractice insurance considerations, the number
of physicians in both rural and urban areas continues to increase.
17°
Indeed, the number of rural physicians has increased at a higher rate
than the number of urban physicians. 171 In light of evidence such as
this, the CBO concluded that the cases for defensive medicine and
doctor flight as significant social problems are both currently "weak
and inconclusive."'
172
IV. THE ONGOING PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN.
Rather than born of reality, the much-publicized "lawsuit crisis"
has been the result of a carefully orchestrated public relations
campaign sponsored by trade associations and other entities with an
lawsuits and agreed to the payment of damages in a number of malpractice
cases in which patients suffered horrible injuries." Id.
166. See VIDMAR, supra note 116, at 74-82.
167. Id. at ii, 82-84.
168. Baicker & Chandra, supra note 13, at 17.
169. Id. at 17, 20.
170. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 15.
171. Id. at 12.
172. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 1.
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interest in reducing access to the civil justice system. 73 After an
early direct-advertising campaign decrying the purported irrationality
of the civil justice system failed to change public attitudes in the
1950s, 174 these entities shifted strategies in an effort to disseminate
similar messages through seemingly independent sources. Especially
beginning in the mid-1980s, proponents of tort restrictions began to
finance the generation of material by nominally independent think
tanks for use by journalists, thereby transforming the message of the
earlier failed advertising campaign into "news."'
175
The principal think tank employed in this capacity over the
intervening twenty years has been the Manhattan Institute for Policy
Research, 176 which in 1986 launched its Project on Civil Justice
Reform with the support of the insurance industry.' 77 As William
Hammett, the Manhattan Institute's president, explained in a 1992
memorandum describing the project's mission:
Journalists need copy, and it's an established fact that over
time they'll "bend" in the direction in which it flows. For
that reason, it is imperative that a steady stream of
understandable research, analysis, and commentary
supporting the need for liability reform be produced. If
sometime during the present decade, a consensus emerges
in favor of serious judicial reform, it will be because
millions of minds have been changed, and only one
institution is powerful enough to bring that about: the
combined force of the nation's print and broadcast media,
the most potent instrument for public education-or
miseducation-in existence. 178
Constant repetition of misleading or even outright false anecdotes
concerning ridiculous suits brought by opportunistic plaintiffs and
lawyers also promotes a public perception of a "lawsuit crisis". For
instance, one frequently repeated anecdote mischaracterizes the
medical malpractice case brought by Judith Richardson Haimes for
173. See Mencimer, supra note 52, at 18-19.
174. See id.
175. See id. at21.
176. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 78, at 40; Mencimer, supra note
52, at 21.
177. Mencimer, supra note 52, at 21.
178. Id.
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injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of her severe allergic
reaction to radioactive dye administered in preparation for a CAT
scan. 17 9 In think tank documents, newspaper articles, and political
speeches, the case is described as one in which a jury awarded Ms.
Haimes almost one million dollars for her claim that she lost her
psychic powers because of a CAT scan.1
80
In reality, Haimes presented the jury with evidence that the
defendant radiologist pressured Haimes to consent to a test-run of a
small dose of an iodine-based dye, despite her warning that she had
been advised to avoid such dyes due to a previous allergic
reaction. 18 1 The injection of the dye allegedly sent Ms. Haimes into
anaphylactic shock before she could begin the CAT scan, and she
spent the next several days with severe nausea, vomiting, and
debilitating headaches. 182 She testified that she continued to suffer
from the severe headaches whenever she engaged in deep mental
concentration, forcing her to quit practicing as a professional
psychic. 183  Haimes asked for relief for the immediate pain and
suffering she experienced as well as for lost income. 184 The judge,
however, did not allow the jury to consider the lost-income claim
because she did not offer expert testimony showing that the dye
caused her continuing headaches.' 85 The judge later vacated the
jury's award as excessive and ordered a new trial, which was
eventually dismissed after a different judge determined that Haimes's
medical expert lacked the proper qualifications.1
86
Anecdotes like the popularized version of the Haimes case,
which present simplistic versions of the facts and selectively omit
key information, are readily reduced to eye-catching headlines, but
do little to promote public understanding and appreciation of the civil
justice system. Few public benefits are apparent in anecdotes that
179. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 78, at 1-4.
180. See id. at 2-4.
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2. Haltom and McCann note that "[n]ational and local law
enforcement officials affirmed that [Haimes] in the past had aided them in
solving crimes through use of her unusual gifts, a legacy well documented for
some time by Philadelphia media." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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invariably portray plaintiffs, jurors, and trial attorneys as abusing the
civil justice system, rather than as deploying it to combat and prevent
malfeasance. The fact that tort legislation has become such a starkly
partisan political issue' 87 only increases the chance that rhetoric,
anecdote, and obfuscation will impede genuine public understanding
of the issues. The full details of the Haimes case present a much
different picture of the civil justice system than the rendition of anti-
tort campaigners: one of a seriously injured plaintiff, a sincere effort
to understand the cause of her suffering, and a judicial process well-
equipped to cut off that search for answers and accountability when
it was no longer justified.
V. CONCLUSION
America does indeed face a healthcare crisis, both in the form of
skyrocketing medical costs and decreasing availability of healthcare
insurance, and in the form of widespread medical error that often
goes unrecognized and uncorrected. The country also faces a
medical-malpractice insurance crisis, as insurance companies and
allied interest groups have succeeded in distracting legislative and
public attention away from the kind of insurance reform that has
proven effective at dampening the business dynamics that give rise to
the underwriting cycle which, in turn, gives rise to episodic insurance
premium crises. What America does not face, however, is a
malpractice lawsuit crisis.
In a prescient 1994 report, the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment warned that, "given new incentives to do
187. Campaign contributions to Republicans from healthcare professionals
and the insurance industry during the past two years have been about double
those to Democrats. See Dana Milbank, The Political Mind Behind Tort
Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A21 (citing the Center for Responsive
Politics' reports on political contributions during the first half of Bush's first
term as president, noting that "health care professionals and insurers have
given two-thirds of their $71 million in contributions to Republicans").
Conversely, the plaintiff's lawyers who would be harmed financially by most
legislative proposals to restrict tort law constitute "the Democratic Party's
second-largest funding base." Mencimer, supra note 40, at 24. Compare
Center. for Responsive Politics, Top Industries: Republican Party (2004
Election Cycle), http://www.crp.org/parties/indus.asp?Cmte=RPC&Cycle=
2004, with Center for Responsive Politics, Top Industries: Democratic Party
(2004 Election Cycle), http://www.crp.org/parties/indus.asp?Cmte=DPC&
cycle=2004.
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less rather than more" in a healthcare system increasingly controlled
by profit-driven HMOs and insurance companies, restrictions on
malpractice liability "that reduce or remove incentives to practice
defensively could reduce or remove a deterrent to providing too little
care at the very time that such mechanisms are most needed."'' 88 If
the current political push for nationwide malpractice liability
restrictions ultimately succeeds, and if powerful external regulatory
controls are not enacted to replace the lost incentives provided by the
civil justice system, the economic forces driving the healthcare
industry will encounter little resistance in the constant press to
minimize costs and maximize income. The results are predictable:
the social costs of injury and suffering from medical negligence-
costs that are typically invisible in policy debates but that are all too
real in our lives-will rise.
A year after it issued the 1994 report, the Office of Technology
Assessment became a victim of the "regulatory reform" movement
that was led by a Congress determined to implement its self-
proclaimed "Contract with America."' 89  During the ensuing ten
years, the same forces that killed the messenger have effectively
stifled the message on medical malpractice, and they are on the verge
of removing the last effective protection for victims of an
increasingly depersonalized system of medical care. Congress
should carefully count the social costs before yielding to pressures
from the healthcare industry to remove the modest remaining
restraints that the civil justice system places on that industry's power
to affect the lives of those in need of medical services.
188. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PUB. No. OTA-H-602,
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 16 (1994), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/-ota/disk l/1994/9405/
9405.pdf.
189. See Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform
and (Breach of) the Contract With America: Improving Environmental Policy
or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 16, 19
(1996) (criticizing elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment).
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